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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 58 2013 NUMBER 2
Notes
PLEASE BE DELICATE WITH MY PERMANENT RECORD: THE
PENDULUM INCHES TOWARDS ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
IN MERKAM v. WACHOVIA
JOSEPH W. CATUZZI*
I. INTRODUCTION
“[I]t will go on your permanent record . . . [!]”1  For elementary
school students the notion of an eternal “permanent record” is quite be-
lievable.2  Fortunately for unruly children, permanent records do not actu-
ally exist.3  At least not until they decide to work in the securities industry.4
Employers in the securities industry are required to state the reasons
why an employee was fired in a Uniform Termination Notice for Securities
Industry Registration (Form U-5).5  After completing an employee’s Form
U-5, an employer files and stores it in the Financial Industry Regulatory
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law.  I would like to
thank my colleagues on the Villanova Law Review for their diligent work and
helpful comments.  I would also like to thank my family, especially Bill and Deirdre
Catuzzi, for their unwavering support, and my friends for their constant
encouragement and advice.
1. Elaine Menardi, Your Permanent Record, SCH. OF DISCIPLES (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://schoolofdisciples.com/2012/04/13/your-permanent-record/ (recounting
how teachers use permanent records to keep students in line).
2. See id. (providing examples of teachers’ use of permanent records to en-
sure students behave in school).
3. See Robert Columbia, My “Permanent Record” Is Gone, THE STRAIGHT DOPE
(Apr. 29, 2011, 4:24 PM), http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.
php?t=606667 (describing inability to obtain permanent record from former pub-
lic school district).
4. For a discussion of how Form U-5s operate as permanent records in the
securities industry, see infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
5. See FINRA, FORM U5: UNIFORM TERMINATION NOTICE FOR SECURITIES INDUS-
TRY REGISTRATION 4 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/indus-
try/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportdocs/p015113.pdf (describing
requirements for employers after terminating registered professional).  Employers
must explain why an employee was fired if he or she was “permitted to resign,”
“discharged,” or let go for other involuntary reasons. See id. (requiring employers
to provide explanation if termination was involuntary).
(211)
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Authority’s (FINRA’s) Central Registration Depository (CRD) where it is
made accessible to all FINRA member firms.6  As if having a “permanent
record” available for future bosses to see is not bad enough, FINRA re-
quires employers to review each candidate’s Form U-5 as part of their hir-
ing process.7  Not surprisingly, employees’ reputations are likely to suffer
greatly from any negative statements in their Form U-5s.8
Although a major purpose of the Form U-5 is to alert regulators and
other employers to unscrupulous broker-dealers, the potential for abuse is
great.9  Form U-5s have been used as a weapon to punish and even black-
mail ex-employees who might leave the firm and take clients with them.10
6. See Dayna B. Tann, Note, Licensing a Lie: The Privilege Attached to the Form U-5
Should Reflect the Realities of the Workplace, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2009)
(explaining Form U-5s are entered into FINRA’s CRD and made available to
FINRA member firms). But cf. Anne H. Wright, Form U-5 Defamation, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1299, 1304–06 (1995) (acknowledging contents of Form U-5s can
sometimes fall into hands of general public). See generally Central Registration Deposi-
tory, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/CRD/ (last
visited Oct. 16, 2012) (providing technical information about FINRA’s CRD).
7. See Regulatory Notice 07-55, FINRA 1–4 (2007), available at www.finra.org/
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/notice/documents/notices/p037480.pdf (re-
minding firms of obligation to investigate business reputation of applicants as part
of hiring process).  The notice explained that checking the backgrounds of pro-
spective employees ultimately protects customers because the searches will show if
the candidate has a history of regulatory violations. See id. (discussing importance
of background search); see also Richard G. Ketchum, About the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct.
16, 2012) (stating that FINRA oversees about 4,345 firms including 163,410 branch
offices).
8. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting negative statements in Form U-5s can bar professionals from indus-
try); cf. Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Any
embellishment or exaggeration can only damage the agent’s professional reputa-
tion and make the job hunt more difficult.”); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 138 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing difficulties experienced by profes-
sionals after being defamed in Form U-5s); Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d
439, 446 (N.Y. 2007) (Pigott, J., dissenting) (“When a defamatory statement is
made on such a Form, there is the danger of substantial harm to the individual
about whom the statement is made.”); see also Jeffrey L. Liddle & Ethan A. Brecher,
Form U-5 Defamation Claims: The End of the Line?  Not So Fast, in SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION 2007 673, 690 (2007) (“A defamatory Form U-5 can ruin an individual’s ca-
reer in the financial services industry.”); Vivek G. Bhatt, The Amended Form U-5: Two
Proposals for Solving the Privilege Dilemma, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 963, 964 (2000) (ex-
plaining how negative statements in Form U-5s can serve as scarlet letters in indi-
vidual’s reputation and inhibit job searches).
9. See Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address Before
the New York Stock Exchange Legal Advisory Committee, What Level of Protec-
tion Is Appropriate for Brokerage Firms in Preparing Form U-5s: Qualified or Ab-
solute Immunity? (May 31, 1996), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1996/spch104.txt (discussing regulatory purpose of Form U-5 and
identifying likelihood of defamation lawsuits); see also Wright, supra note 6, at 1308
(noting potential for abuse in Form U-5 reporting system).
10. See Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc. v. Ulrich, 692 So. 2d 915, 916-17 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (noting departing employee’s Form U-5 was allegedly used as bar-
tering tool to obtain preferential settlement).  In Eaton, the plaintiff claimed that
2
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In one instance, an employee was fired after allegedly being told to ignore
or participate in regulatory fraud.11  Ironically, the employee’s Form U-5
explained that he was terminated for “failure to perform duties . . . .”12  In
a defamation suit, the employee was awarded $40,535 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.13  However, if this outrageous
conduct occurred in New York today, the employer would be completely
immune from civil liability.14
his employer told him that the wording in his Form U-5 would be modified if he
accepted a certain severance package offer. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s claim); cf.
Culver v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 94 CIV. 8124, 1995 WL 422203, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 17, 1995) (describing plaintiff’s claim that his ex-employer intentionally re-
ported false statements in his Form U-5).  In Culver, the plaintiff alleged that his
employer used the Form U-5 to retaliate against him for reporting unethical activi-
ties to regulators. See Culver, 1995 WL 422203, at *1 (discussing plaintiff’s claim).
However, the court held that regardless of the employer’s motive, statements made
in Form U-5s are subject to absolute privilege making the employer immune from
civil liability. See id. at *5 (stating Form U-5s are absolutely privileged); see also
Scott Krady, You Have Recourse if Ex-Employer Defames You on U-5 Termination Form,
EFINANCIAL CAREERS (Mar. 31, 2010), http://news.efinancialcareers.com/2603/
you-have-recourse-if-ex-employer-defames-you-on-u-5-termination-form/ (listing
situations where employees were defamed by former employers in Form U-5s and
received large awards); Wright, supra note 6, at 1302 (“Indeed, it is widely acknowl-
edged that false Form U-5 reporting has sometimes been used to retaliate against
departing employees or threatened to gain concessions from such employ-
ees.”(footnote omitted)).
11. See Acciardo v. Millennium Sec. Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (discussing plaintiff’s defamation claim).  The district court determined
whether the arbitration panel acted with a manifest disregard for the law and
awarded the plaintiff with punitive damages for his defamation claim. See id. (pro-
viding background information of case); see also Petitioner-Respondent’s Memo-
randum of Law in Support of Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and in
Opposition to Respondents-Cross-Petitioners’ Cross-Motion to Vacate Award, Ac-
ciardo v. Millenium Sec. Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 99 Civ.
3371), 1999 WL 33885589 (describing regulatory frauds taking place at firm).  The
plaintiff claimed that his ex-employer was intentionally failing to inform regulators
of over forty-two customer complaints. See Petitioner-Respondent’s Memorandum,
supra (describing employer’s misconduct).  According to the plaintiff, he was fired
after refusing to sign a legal document that stated the company had no customer
arbitration claims, regulatory proceedings, and subordinate debt. See id. (noting
plaintiff’s refusal facilitated fraud).  The plaintiff’s replacement also testified that
the defendant threatened to make unfavorable statements in her Form U-5 if she
said anything negative about the firm. See id. (detailing replacement’s experience
with defendant).
12. Acciardo, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (stating contents of plaintiff’s Form U-5).
13. Id. at 416 (explaining arbitration award); see also Petitioner-Respondent’s
Memorandum, supra note 11 (recounting reasoning for punitive award).  The arbi-
tration panel’s decision to award punitive damages was based on findings of mal-
ice. See Petitioner-Respondent’s Memorandum, supra note 11 (“The Panel
apparently found that Millennium played the ‘U-5 game’ and intentionally sought
to harm Acciardo as it had done with various other departing employees whose
Form U-5s were admitted into evidence and who testified at the hearing.”).
14. For a discussion of the absolute privilege standard in New York, see infra
note 17 and accompanying text.  If this case were decided seven years later the
employer would be completely immune from civil liability. See generally Acciardo, 83
F. Supp. 2d 413.
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The issue of how much protection employers should receive for state-
ments made in Form U-5s remains controversial and unsettled.15  A major-
ity of courts have held that employers should receive qualified privilege, or
protection that can be lost if the employer acts with malice or a reckless
disregard for the truth.16  However, a call for absolute immunity has
emerged.17  Weighing in on the dispute, a former commissioner of the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) reasoned that the SEC should
consider establishing a uniform qualified-privilege rule if “the pendulum
begins to swing in favor of absolute immunity” because of the inequitable
results which can occur when employees are maliciously defamed.18
In the absence of any uniform rule, jurisdictions without laws requir-
ing qualified privilege are likely to hear arguments favoring absolute privi-
15. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1027 (“Whether an absolute or qualified privi-
lege applies to the Form U-5 is a hotly contested issue that has evaded uniform
resolution.”).
16. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (applying Illinois law and holding Form U-5 disclosures were subject to qual-
ified privilege); cf. Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 137 (6th
Cir. 1996) (applying Tennessee law and determining statements in Form U-5s were
subject to qualified privilege); Wietecha v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp., CIV 05-0324,
2006 WL 2772838, at *18 (D. Ariz. 2006) (concluding that qualified privilege for
Form U-5s comported with Arizona law); Dickinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 247, 262 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding employers’
statements in Form U-5s were protected by qualified privilege after reviewing Con-
necticut law); In re Wakefield, 293 B.R. 372, 384 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (stating Form U-
5s were entitled to qualified privilege in Texas); Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc. v.
Ulrich, 692 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that qualified
privilege applied to Form U-5 disclosures in Florida).
17. See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 2007) (holding
absolute privilege applied to employers’ statements in Form U-5s under New York
law); cf. Fontani v. Wells Fargo Invs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(concluding that statements in Form U-5s were absolutely privileged under Califor-
nia law); Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (holding statements made in Form U-5s were subject to absolute privilege);
Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pleas LEXIS 85, at *19
(Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (applying New York law and concluding absolute privi-
lege applied to statements made in Form U-5s in Pennsylvania); Terry R. Weiss &
Nathan D. Chapman, Permission to Be Frank?  The Debate Continues Over an Absolute
Versus Qualified Immunity in U5 Defamation Cases, SEC. REG. & L. REP. 5 (BNA) (June
2007), available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/8444ad15-41c1-445f-
b85d-be53982e49c9/Presentation/NewsAttachment/6847e35f-fb58-4a06-84d7-8c
f6472cbb0e/PermissiontoBeFrank.pdf (asserting Rosenberg will likely be used as
persuasive authority in jurisdictions outside of New York).
18. See Hunt, supra note 9, at 6 (advocating for uniform qualified privilege
rule if courts begin to hold in favor of absolute privilege).  Commissioner Hunt
was concerned that without the safeguard of civil liability the risks of employer
abuse would be “too great.” See id. (discussing dangers of absolute privilege stan-
dard); see also Wright, supra note 6, at 1328 (“Regulators generally have supported
according broker-dealers a qualified privilege for Form U-5 reporting that is de-
famatory and untrue.”).  Leaders of the SEC and Self-Regulatory Organizations
(SROs) have supported a qualified privilege standard. See Wright, supra note 6, at
1328 (describing support for qualified privilege rule).
4
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lege.19  Pennsylvania, a state that is home to one of the largest populations
of securities industry professionals, does not have a uniform standard re-
garding the degree of protection employers should receive.20  As a result,
Pennsylvanian employees have obtained large defamation awards against
former employers who inaccurately or maliciously filed their Form U-5s.21
Yet, according to the court in Merkam v. Wachovia Corp.,22 securities
professionals in the Keystone state should not be able to sue employers for
defamation under any circumstances.23  The court explained that absolute
immunity best promotes the candid flow of information from firms to reg-
ulators and, in effect, provides the best protection to investors.24  The
court, however, refrained from addressing the clear potential for abuse or
the significant damage employees might experience if employers draft
Form U-5s with malicious or reckless intent.25
The Merkam case is evidence that the call for absolute privilege has
reached the trial court level and illustrates a likely trend in Form U-5 defa-
mation litigation.26  Hence, if the pendulum continues to swing towards
absolute privilege, the SEC should take action to protect employees’ repu-
19. See John J. Clarke, Jr. & Deborah Meshulam, New York Court Holds that Form
U-5 Statements Cannot Be a Basis for Defamation Liability, SEC. LITIG. ALERT (DLA
Piper, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/
upload/10142_Securities_Litigation_Alert_Form_U5_April_2007_v5gm.html
(commenting that absolute privilege could become prevailing law in undecided
states).
20. See FINRA, NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 97-77 666 n.4 (1997), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/notice/documents/no-
tices/p004412.pdf (stating Pennsylvania is state with large number of FINRA regis-
tered representatives).
21. See SAC Survey of SRO Defamation Awards, 8 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, No. 8,
2007, at 5, 7–8, available at http://www.sacarbitration.com/pdf/Defamation%2019
89-1994.pdf (analyzing defamation awards from Form U-5 arbitration panels).
The study demonstrates that Pennsylvania is traditionally among the top five states
in terms of the number of Form U-5 defamation disputes and the size of awards.
See id. (comparing size of defamation awards in Pennsylvania to other states).
22. No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 85 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008).
23. See id. at *19 (concluding statements made in Form U-5s should be abso-
lutely privileged).
24. See id. at *18 (explaining absolute privilege promotes flow of information
from employers to regulators).
25. For a discussion of the court’s reasoning, see infra notes 115–44 and ac-
companying text.
26. See John P. Clarke & Mary Noe, Legal Actions for Defamation by Terminated
Employees in the Financial Services Industry: Can a Required Filing Have an Unfair Effect
on Some Terminated Employees, 23 BANK ACCT. & FIN., Dec. 1, 2009, at 41 available at
2009 WLNR 26393944 (“[I]t is more likely that the absolute privilege rule will
ultimately be the prevailing rule in the industry.”).
5
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tations.27  If absolute privilege becomes the law in Pennsylvania, securities
professionals will be at the mercy of their employers, not regulators.28
This Note argues that the Merkam court reached the correct outcome,
but that the court should not have extended absolute privilege to the
Form U-5.29  Part II describes the regulatory role of the Form U-5, dis-
cusses the arguments for qualified and absolute privilege, and provides a
brief history of absolute privilege in Pennsylvania.30  Part III provides an
overview of the facts and the court’s reasoning in Merkam.31  Part IV argues
that the Form U-5 reporting system should not be absolutely privileged
because it is not part of a quasi-judicial process, and it does not definitively
protect the general investing public.32  Finally, Part V concludes by ex-
plaining the significance of Merkam.33
II. BACKGROUND
Generally, employers refrain from giving negative letters of recom-
mendation regarding ex-employees to avoid defending costly defamation
suits.34  Much to the distaste of cautious employers, regulators require
them to provide “employee references” by completing a Form U-5.35
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the compulsory nature of Form
U-5 reporting has sparked substantial debate over whether employers
should be given qualified or absolute immunity.36  Reviewing the argu-
ments for both types of immunity, as well as the conservative history of
27. See Hunt, supra note 9, at 5–6 (addressing importance of protecting vul-
nerable employees).  Hunt explained that “regulators should proceed cautiously
before establishing a system that would insulate intentional retaliatory conduct
from review.” Id. at 5
28. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (concluding that allowing employers to be absolutely immune from civil
liability would allow employers to “blackball” former employees from the industry).
29. For a discussion of why the court in Merkam should not have extended
absolute privilege to the Form U-5, see infra notes 164–73 and accompanying text.
30. For a further discussion of the regulatory role of Form U-5s in the securi-
ties industry, see infra notes 34–54 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the
arguments for absolute privilege and qualified privilege, see infra notes 55–98 and
accompanying text.  For a discussion of the history of absolute privilege in Penn-
sylvania, see infra notes 99–114 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of the facts and reasoning of the court in Merkam,
see infra notes 115–44 and accompanying text.
32. For a critical analysis of the Merkam decision, see infra notes 164–73 and
accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the impact of Merkam, see infra notes 184–86
and accompanying text.
34. See Job References, LAWYERS.COM, http://labor-employment-law.lawyers.
com/wrongful-termination/Job-References.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (ex-
plaining employers are reluctant to give reference letters because they fear being
sued for defamation by former employees).
35. For a description of the role of Form U-5s in the securities industry, see
infra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of how Form U-5s can potentially spark defamation suits,
see infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
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absolute immunity, reveals that extending absolute immunity to employers
unfairly jeopardizes employees’ reputations and conflicts with its original
purpose.37
A. The Role of Permanent Records in the Securities Industry
In the schoolyard of the securities industry, the SEC is the school
board; FINRA is the principal; firms are teachers, and employees are stu-
dents.38  In much the same way that a school depends on its teachers to
report problematic students to the principal, the securities industry relies
on firms to inform regulators of employees’ unethical or illegal behav-
ior.39  At the heart of this self-regulatory system are the Form U-4 and
Form U-5, which register and terminate professionals with FINRA,
respectively.40
To “enroll” in the securities industry, individuals must register with
FINRA by submitting a Form U-4.41  By filing Form U-4s, individuals con-
37. For a discussion of the arguments for qualified and absolute privilege and
the history of absolute privilege, see infra notes 70–114 and accompanying text.
38. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organi-
zations Be Considered Government Agencies? 1–8 (Mar. 2008), available at http://
works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=roberta_karmel
(providing overview of self-regulatory system in securities industry and discussing
essential role played by SROs).  Traditionally, SROs have been private membership
organizations that promote regulatory and market functions. See id. at 1–5 (defin-
ing traditional roles of SROs).  As regulators, SROs enforced their own standards
and federal securities laws but in their private role SROs created exchanges where
member firms could sell and trade securities. See id. at 5 (describing SROs’ func-
tions).  The most prominent SROs include the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). See id. at 2 (identify-
ing major SROs).  In order to successfully perform regulatory functions, SROs de-
pend on its member firms to voluntarily self-regulate and report violations. See id.
at 13–14 (discussing self-regulation).  In an effort to consolidate rules, improve
SEC oversight, and to make self-regulation more efficient, the SEC approved the
merger of the NASD and NYSE’s regulatory bodies into FINRA. See id. at 27–29
(discussing inclusion of NASD and NYSE); see also FINRA, GET TO KNOW US 1–3
(2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/
@about/documents/corporate/p118667.pdf (describing FINRA’s role in securi-
ties industry).  FINRA’s principal duties include licensing and monitoring industry
professionals, ensuring that firms comply with industry and federal regulations,
and administering the largest arbitration forum to resolve securities-related dis-
putes. See Karmel, supra, at 27–29 (explaining FINRA’s principal duties).
39. See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 444 (N.Y. 2007) (explain-
ing that information provided by firms to regulators is critical to effective self-regu-
latory system).  The court emphasized that candid information provided by firms
in Form U-5s enables FINRA to carry out its regulatory functions and sanction
unethical brokers. See id. (noting benefits of Form U-5s).
40. See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 8, at 677 (describing regulatory signifi-
cance of Form U-4 and Form U-5).
41. See FINRA, FORM U4: UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR SECURITIES INDUSTRY RE-
GISTRATION OR TRANSFER 1 (2009), available at http://www.finra.rg/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportdocs/p015111.pdf (ex-
plaining purpose of Form U-4).  The official instructions of the Form U-4 provide
that, “[r]epresentatives of broker-dealers, investment advisers, or issuers of securi-
7
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sent to settle any disputes with their employers through FINRA’s arbitra-
tion system.42  Additionally, Form U-4s authorize employers to furnish
information regarding an employee’s history at the firm and reasons for
termination to prospective employers.43
The Form U-5, or the “permanent record,” is the official filing used to
terminate the association between securities professionals and FINRA.44
Employers must complete and submit an ex-employee’s Form U-5 within
thirty days of termination.45  While the Form U-5’s primary function is to
notify FINRA that an employee has left a firm, its higher purpose is to
protect investors and employers from unscrupulous representatives by al-
erting regulators and other firms to problematic representatives.46
ties must use this form to become registered in the appropriate jurisdictions and/or
SROs.” Id.  Registered representatives have a continual obligation to update their
Form U-4s. See id. (noting individuals are under ongoing obligation to make sure
information is accurate).
42. See Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer, FINRA
15 (May 2009), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@re-
gis/documents/appsupportdocs/p015112.pdf (providing consent to settle dis-
putes via FINRA arbitration). Part 5 of question 15A states, “I agree to arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a cus-
tomer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, con-
stitutions, or by-laws of the SROs indicated in Section 4 . . . .” Id.
43. See id. (providing consent to disclose information to prospective employ-
ers).  Part eight of question 15A states:
I authorize all my employers and any other person to furnish to any juris-
diction, SRO, designated entity, employer, prospective employer, or any
agent acting on its behalf, any information they have, including without
limitation my creditworthiness, character, ability, business activities, edu-
cational background, general reputation, history of my employment and,
in the case of former employers, complete reasons for my termination.
Id.
44. See FINRA, WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE U4 AND U5 FILING PROCESS 3
(2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@edu/docu-
ments/education/p018907.pdf (stating that employers must complete Form U-5s
when employees stop working at firm).
45. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 10-39 1 (2010), available at http://www.
finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/
p122040.pdf (“Under Article V, Section 3 of the FINRA By-Laws, firms are re-
quired to file Form U5 no later than 30 days after terminating an associated per-
son’s registration.”).
46. See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 442-43 (N.Y. 2007) (ex-
plaining purpose of Form U-5 is to protect investing public from unethical bro-
kers); cf. Cicconi v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 808 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (stating absolute privilege in Form U-5 reporting is meant to protect inves-
tors); see also Bloomberg Business News, Only a Small Victory for Securities Firms “U-5”
Seal Dismissal in Fired-Broker Case, BALT. SUN (Dec. 29, 1996), http://articles.bal-
timoresun.com/1996-12-29/business/1996364009_1_u-5-arbitration-securities-
firms (recognizing purpose of Form U-5 is to protect investors from rouge bro-
kers); see also Hunt, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining purpose and beneficiaries of
Form U-5).  According to Hunt, “[t]he ultimate beneficiaries, of course, are the
prey of the problem sales representatives—unsuspecting investors.”  Hunt, supra
note 9, at 2.
8
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In a Form U-5, an employer must state his or her reasons for firing an
employee and provide explanations if the ex-employee is undergoing any
internal or criminal investigations.47  The Form U-5 is then filed in
FINRA’s CRD, making individuals’ permanent records available to virtu-
ally all employers in the securities industry.48  Ideally, the flow of informa-
tion from firms to regulators and other employers better positions
regulators to sanction rogue brokers and helps employers make informed
hiring and supervisory decisions.49
In an era of highly publicized financial fraud, preventing rogue bro-
kers from roaming recklessly through the industry has become a signifi-
cant public interest.50  These rogue brokers include individuals who
participate in Ponzi schemes, falsify customer documents, or convert client
funds to their own use.51  Although stopping the movement of these un-
47. See FORM U5: UNIFORM TERMINATION NOTICE FOR SECURITIES INDUSTRY RE-
GISTRATION, supra note 5, at 5 (providing requirements for Form U-5 filing pro-
cess).  In section three, employers are required to state the reason why an
employee was fired if the termination was involuntary. See id. (describing require-
ments for completing reason of termination).  In section seven, employers must
provide a detailed explanation if they answer “yes” to any of the listed questions.
See id. at 6 (providing disclosure requirements when criminal or regulatory pro-
ceedings are pending or ongoing against employee); see also Uniform Termination
Notice for Securities Industry Registration, FINRA 7-8 (May 2009), http://www.finra.
org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportdocs/
p015114.pdf (listing mandatory disclosure questions).
48. See Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration, supra note
47, at 1 (requiring submission of Form U-5 to CRD).  An individual’s Form U-5 is
available to virtually the entire industry because FINRA regulates around 4,345
firms including 163,410 branch offices. See Ketchum, supra note 7 (providing
statistics).
49. See Cicconi, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (declaring significance of information flow
from firms to regulators).  The court stated, “[o]nly by clear descriptions of ques-
tionable conduct by brokers can we best ensure that any future employers and
customers have notice of any such conduct in their interactions with those bro-
kers.” Id.; see also Hunt, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining Form U-5s ensure firms are
aware of important risks employees pose).
50. See Fontani v. Wells Fargo Invs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 841 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (recognizing content of Form U-5s are matter of public interest).  The court
in Fontani implied that disclosures in Form U-5s are a matter of public interest
because broker misconduct can affect a significant amount of investors or even an
entire market. See NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 97-77, supra note 20, at 662 (declar-
ing that Form U-5s are matter of public interest).  The notice explained that the
“full disclosure of disciplinary problems on Forms U-4 and U-5 is in the public
interest.” Id.
51. See Nicholas J. Guiliano, FINRA Boots Broker for Misappropriating $100K,
STOCKBROKER FRAUD, SECURITIES ARBITRATION, INVESTMENT FRAUD LAWYERS (July
27, 2012), http://www.stockbrokerfraud.com/law-blog/finra-boots-broker-for-mis-
appropriating-100k (describing case where broker converted clients’ funds to his
own use).  FINRA permanently barred a representative from the securities industry
after he converted over $100,000 of his customers’ funds. See id. (discussing bro-
ker’s misconduct); cf. Bruce Kelly, Private Placements Cause Finra to Slam Eight Broker-
Dealers, INVESTMENTNEWS (Dec. 4, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.
com/article/20111204/REG/312049969 (providing examples of fraudulent prac-
tices and FINRA disciplinary actions); see also FINRA Lawyers on Ponzi Schemes in
9
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ethical brokers is a worthy cause, employees that are far from “rogue”
sometimes become the reporting system’s collateral damage.52  For exam-
ple, negative remarks in the Form U-5 of an employee who was fired for
mediocre job performance or for personality mismatches can prevent the
employee from reentering the industry.53  Due to the serious impact of
these negative statements, Form U-5s have become a hotbed for defama-
tion disputes.54
B. When Teachers Are not Delicate with Students’ Permanent Records
In Pennsylvania, a person has an action for defamation if an opinion
is vague and “implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts.”55
The Third Circuit rationalized the importance of providing facts by ex-
plaining that when an opinion “draws upon unstated facts for its basis, the
listener is unable to make an evaluation of the soundness of the opin-
ion.”56  On the other hand, if an individual clearly lays out facts to support
History, MEYERWILSON, http://www.investorclaims.com/library/finra-lawyers-and-
ponzi-schemes-in-history.cfm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (listing situations where
brokers engaged in Ponzi schemes).
52. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (explaining how negative statements in Form U-5s can seriously impact em-
ployees’ reputations).
53. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1019 (discussing fragile nature of securities pro-
fessionals’ reputations).  The author stated, “even one negative statement on the
Form U-5 may hamper the broker’s job opportunities.” Id.; see also Liddle &
Brecher, supra note 8, at 675 (describing how Form U-5s can be unfair to good
brokers).  Form U-5 disclosures might protect the general public from “bad bro-
kers” at the expense of the reputation of “good brokers.” See Liddle & Brecher,
supra note 8, at 675 (explaining impact of Form U-5s on all securities
professionals).
54. See Bhatt, supra note 8, at 964 (describing how embellishments in Form U-
5s can have devastating effects on reputations); cf. Tann, supra note 6, at 1025
(noting false statements in Form U-5s can prevent individuals from becoming em-
ployed in securities industry); see also Kevin Burke, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, INV.
ADVISER (Sept. 22, 2008), 2008 WLNR 17993329 (“In a highly competitive field, the
mere appearance of impropriety is enough for a firm to pass on hiring you.”);
Liddle & Brecher, supra note 8, at 690 (“A defamatory Form U-5 can ruin an indi-
vidual’s career in the financial services industry.”).
55. See Green v. Mizner, 692 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“A defama-
tory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion but a
statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 566 (1977))).  The court cited comment (c) of section 566 of the Second
Restatement of Torts that states:
A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nonde-
famatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no mat-
ter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how
derogatory it is.  But an expression of opinion that is not based on dis-
closed or assumed facts and therefore implies that there are undisclosed
facts on which the opinion is based, is treated differently.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977).
56. Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970, 972 (3d Cir. 1985).
10
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his or her opinion, the statement will not be defamatory.57  In effect, state-
ments can be embarrassing or even detrimental to one’s reputation but
not defamatory if enough supporting facts are provided.58
To defend against defamation, employers can argue that their state-
ments were true or privileged.59  First, the truth is always an absolute de-
fense to defamation.60  In Form U-5 disputes, employers will never be
liable if they are honest and identify sufficient facts to support the basis of
their statements.61  Although the degree of privilege in Pennsylvania is
undetermined, employers, at a minimum, will receive qualified privilege.62
57. See Goralski v. Pizzimenti, 540 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)
(holding statements cannot be defamatory if they clearly lay out supporting facts).
In Goralski, a teacher claimed that her former employer defamed her by publishing
a letter documenting the reasons for her termination. See id. (describing plaintiff-
teacher’s claims).  However, the court explained that the letter was not defamatory
because it contained facts including that the plaintiff failed to return calls and
mistreated another employee. See id. (reasoning statements were not defamatory
because facts were supplied).
58. See id. (“It is not sufficient, however, if the words are merely annoying or
embarrassing to plaintiff.”).
59. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b)(1)-(2) (West 1978) (“In an action
for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving, when the issue is prop-
erly raised: (1) The truth of the defamatory communication[, and] (2) The privi-
leged character of the occasion on which it was published.”).
60. See Corabi v. Curtis Pub’g Co., 273 A.2d 899, 908 (Pa. 1971) (explaining
truth is absolute defense to defamation); see also Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866
N.E.2d 439, 447 (N.Y. 2007) (Pigott, J., dissenting) (noting truthful statements on
Form U-5s would not give rise to defamation liability).
61. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1025 (explaining truth is absolute defense in
Form U-5 defamation); see also Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1168
(7th Cir. 1998) (noting employers are required to provide complete and accurate
information in Form U-5s).  The court observed that the NASD requires firms to
provide “all relevant information available to the member, including facts that
would lend support to or cast doubt on the truth of the allegations.” Dawson, 135
F.3d at 1168.
62. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 3–4 (explaining that in Pennsylvania state-
ments made by employers on Form U-5s are subject to qualified privilege).  The
article cites 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.1, which in relevant part states:
An employer who discloses information about a current or former em-
ployee’s job performance to a prospective employer of the current or for-
mer employee, upon request of the prospective employer or the current
or former employee, is presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless
lack of good faith is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence is
immune from civil liability for such disclosure or its consequences in any
case brought against the employer by the current or former employee.
The presumption of good faith may be rebutted only by clear and con-
vincing evidence establishing that the employer disclosed information
that:(1) the employer knew was false or in the exercise of due diligence
should have known was false;(2) the employer knew was materially mis-
leading;(3) was false and rendered with reckless disregard as to the truth
or falsity of the information; or(4) was information the disclosure of
which is prohibited by any contract, civil, common law or statutory right
of the current or former employee.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.1(a).
11
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Under qualified privilege, employers are protected unless they act with
malice or a reckless disregard for the truth.63
Despite two strong defenses to defamation, employers hesitate to dis-
close important details regarding an employee’s termination.64  This “chil-
ling effect” results primarily from the possibility of civil liability.65  In other
words, employers are keenly aware that they can find themselves in arbitra-
tion proceedings where “big money” can be at stake.66
New York is the only state to uniformly provide employers with the
ultimate assurance of absolute immunity.67  However, courts in California
and Pennsylvania have also held that employers’ statements in Form U-5s
should be absolutely privileged.68  In this debate over the degree of privi-
lege, the arguments for and against qualified and absolute privilege are
well documented.69
1. The Pro-Student Rule: Qualified Privilege
Proponents of qualified privilege argue that it best balances the inter-
ests of employees, employers, regulators, and investors.70  First, qualified
63. See Corabi, 273 A.2d at 909 (“[I]f the privileged occasion is but a qualified
one and it be shown that defendant was actuated by malice, the defense of quali-
fied privilege is vitiated.”).
64. For a discussion of the defenses, see supra notes 60–63 and accompanying
text.
65. See Wright, supra note 6, at 1300–01 (noting that some employers believe
it is safer choice to issue clean Form U-5s regardless of whether it is warranted); see
also Clarke, supra note 26 (“While truth is an absolute defense in defamation com-
plaints, the employer’s high cost of defending those actions could have an adverse
influence on setting forth the full basis for termination.”); SEC Has No Evidence U-5
Defamation Claims Hurt Firms, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Oct. 1, 2000), http://
wealthmanagement.com/archive/sec-has-no-evidence-u-5-defamation-claims-hurt-
firms (explaining that regulators are concerned employers’ fear of defamation
claims has reduced informational value of Form U-5s).
66. See Martin Harris, Defamation on Form U-5: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard
Place,SEC. INDUSTRY EMP. LITIG. ALERT (Drinker, Biddle & Reath L.L.P, Chicago,
Ill.), Oct. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/resources/publi-
cations/2008/defamation-on-form-u-5—caught-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place
(“In a number of recent cases, negative information on a U-5 has triggered lawsuits
for defamation in which the plaintiffs won millions of dollars.”); see also Liddle &
Brecher, supra note 8 (listing NASD and NYSE defamation awards).
67. See New York Court of Appeals Resolves Form U-5 Dispute, LABOR & EMP. UP-
DATE (SchiffHardin L.L.P. New York, N.Y.), June 29, 2007, available at http://www.
schiffhardin.com/publications/labor_jun29_07/article4.html (explaining how
uniform absolute privilege only exists in New York).
68. See Fontani v. Wells Fargo Invs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 842 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (applying California law to hold absolute privilege covers statements made
in Form U-5s); see also Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com.
Pl. LEXIS 85, at *18 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (adopting New York law to hold
absolute privilege applies to statements made in Form U-5s).
69. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 1–5 (reciting arguments for absolute and quali-
fied privilege).
70. See Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that qualified privilege protects interests of all parties); see also Tann, supra
12
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privilege protects employees by allowing them to hold employers account-
able for false or misleading statements made in Form U-5s.71  Given the
serious consequences that Form U-5 disclosures can have on an individ-
ual’s career, qualified privilege can be viewed as more equitable because it
enables employees to be fairly compensated for damages that arise when
employers misuse Form U-5s to intentionally damage reputations.72
Under an absolute privilege standard, however, defamed employees can
only clear their names through expensive expungement proceedings.73
Second, qualified privilege protects employers because they retain im-
munity as long as they tell the truth and refrain from recklessly drafting
Form U-5s.74  Moreover, the threat of liability can deter employers from
exaggerating or drafting misleading statements in Form U-5s.75  As a re-
sult, regulators and the general investing public benefit because more ac-
curate information is transmitted from firms to regulators.76
Acknowledging that qualified privilege provides benefits to all parties,
a majority of courts have held in favor of qualified privilege.77  Several
states have even enacted statutes requiring qualified privilege.78  Finally,
note 6, at 1033 (asserting that qualified privilege balances interests of employees
and employers).
71. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (discussing how qualified privilege protects employees).  The court ex-
plained that insulating employers would allow them to “blackball” former employ-
ees from the entire industry. See id.
72. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1037 (providing instances of Form U-5s being
used to retaliate against employees).  In one instance, an employer changed the
statements in an employee’s Form U-5 after discovering that the employee was
switching to a competitor. See id. (detailing facts of dispute); see also Svigos v. Mer-
rill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 93-04516, 2000 WL 1808278, at *3 (Oct.
6, 2000) (describing arbitration award for defamation).  In Svigos, Merrill Lynch
was held liable for $1,025,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive
damages for intentionally defaming an ex-employee in his Form U-5. See Svigos,
2000 WL 1808278, at *3.
73. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1042–43 (asserting that expungement proceed-
ings are expensive and defamed employees are left to bear cost); see also Burke,
supra note 54 (describing expungement process as herculean task).
74. See Dawson, 135 F.3d at 1164 (explaining employers are not liable for defa-
mation if their disclosures are true); see also Tann, supra note 6, at 1038–39 (argu-
ing qualified privilege provides adequate protection for employers).
75. See Hunt, supra note 9, at 5 (“[A]bsent safeguards, such as civil liability,
the risks of broker-dealer abuse are too great and the consequences for associated
persons too onerous to provide absolute immunity for Form U-5s.”); see also Tann,
supra note 6, at 1039 (asserting that absolute privilege removes incentive for em-
ployers to act in good faith).
76. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1040 (“[Q]ualified privilege benefits the securi-
ties industry by encouraging employers to give complete and accurate
references.”).
77. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 2–3 (stating qualified privilege is majority
rule).
78. See id. at 2 (listing states that have enacted qualified privilege statutes).  A
prime example is Hawaii’s qualified privilege statute, which states:
13
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prominent regulatory officials in the industry have also called for a uni-
form qualified privilege rule to be adopted.79
2. The Pro-Teacher Rule: Absolute Privilege
Proponents of absolute privilege argue that it best supports the regu-
latory objectives of the Form U-5 and protects employers who are com-
pelled to make the statements as part of a quasi-judicial proceeding.80
First, removing civil liability eliminates the main reason why employers is-
sue “clean” Form U-5s.81  Second, the mandatory submission of Form U-5s
to FINRA can be viewed as part of a quasi-judicial proceeding.82  Finally,
Form U-5s should be absolutely privileged because their content is a mat-
ter of general public concern (i.e., unethical brokers can seriously harm
the investing public).83
In response to the argument that employers might abuse their immu-
nity, supporters of absolute privilege argue that there are safeguards in the
A broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, federal covered investment
adviser, or investment adviser representative shall not be liable to another
broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, federal covered investment ad-
viser, or investment adviser representative for defamation . . . unless the
person knew, or should have known at the time that the statement was
made, that it was false in a material respect or the person acted in reckless
disregard of the statement’s truth or falsity.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 485A-507 (LexisNexis 2006).
79. See Wright, supra note 6, at 1328 (“[R]egulators generally have supported
according broker-dealers a qualified privilege for Form U-5 reporting that is de-
famatory and untrue.”); cf. Tann, supra note 6, at 1043–45 (noting efforts to create
qualified privilege standard).  In 1998, the NASD proposed a uniform qualified
immunity rule to protect employees from misleading or false statements made in
Form U-5s. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1043–45 (describing proposed qualified
privilege rule).  However, the proposal never became law due to concerns over
whether the NASD had the authority to impose a uniform rule that differed from
state law. See id. (explaining failure of proposal to become effective).  Four years
later in 2002, Commissioners of the Uniform Securities Act proposed a model
qualified privilege rule for states to adopt. See id. (noting that several states have
adopted model qualified privilege statutes); see also UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, § 507
(2002) (“A broker-dealer . . . is not liable . . . unless the person knew, or should
have known at the time that the statement was made, that it was false in a material
respect or the person acted in reckless disregard of the statement’s truth or
falsity.”).
80. See Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
85, at *18–19 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (explaining that unimpeded flow of infor-
mation promotes more disclosures of unethical behavior).
81. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1040–41 (describing employers reluctance to
provide more information without absolute immunity); see also Hunt, supra note 9,
at 3 (“[A] widely-held believe is that some firms supply ‘clean’ Forms U-5 to avoid
possible defamation exposure.”).
82. See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 444 (N.Y. 2007) (finding
Form U-5s to be part of quasi-judicial process).
83. See Fontani v. Wells Fargo Invs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 842 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (holding statements in Form U-5s should be absolutely privileged because
they concern conduct capable of affecting large numbers of people).
14
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reporting system to protect employees.84  As a general matter, all FINRA
member firms are under an obligation to act in good faith when complet-
ing and updating Form U-5s.85  Employers that purposely report inaccu-
rate or misleading information on a Form U-5 can be subjected to fines
and other administrative penalties.86  To ensure compliance, FINRA rou-
tinely investigates Form U-5s for accuracy.87  Finally, employees can find
relief within the system by commencing expungement proceedings to
clear their records.88
The most significant decision in favor of absolute privilege comes
from the New York Court of Appeals in Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc.89  In Ro-
senberg, the court classified the submission of Form U-5s as being part of a
quasi-judicial process.90  The court reasoned that NASD is a quasi-govern-
84. See Jeffery Zuckerman, New York Court Finds Absolute Immunity Applies to Bro-
ker-Dealer U-5 Termination Statements, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Apr. 5, 2007), available
at 2007 WLNR 6492222 (describing safeguards in Form U-5 reporting system that
protect employees).
85. See id. (explaining that FINRA requires firms to complete accurate disclo-
sures); see also FINRA, FORM U4 AND U5 INTERPRETIVE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1-13
(2013), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/
@regis/documents/appsupportdocs/p119944.pdf (acknowledging employers’
continuing obligation to provide accurate and complete information in Form U-
5s).
86. See REGULATORY NOTICE 10-39, supra note 45, (explaining that firms can
face administrative and civil penalties for not providing complete and accurate
information in Form U-5s); see also Melanie Waddell, FINRA’s Top 5 Enforcement
Issues of 2011, ADVISORONE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.advisorone.com/2012/
03/12/finras-top-5-enforcement-issues-of-2011?page=2 (listing FINRA’s top en-
forcement issues).  In 2011, there were four cases where an employer was fined
over $600,000 for not reporting material information in a Form U-5. See Waddell,
supra (discussing violations for inaccurate Form U-5s).
87. See id. (noting regulators often check accuracy and completeness of Form
U-5s).
88. See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 2007) (explain-
ing that defamed employees can commence arbitration proceedings to clear their
records). But see Tann, supra note 6, at 1042–43 (discussing realities of expunge-
ment proceedings).  Expungement proceedings are expensive and a defamed em-
ployee’s reputation may be damaged too greatly before the proceeding can
provide a result. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1043 (“If a broker is in fact successful in
getting a statement expunged, he may be out of work for years until the expunge-
ment actually occurs, and the harm at that point may be irreparable.”).
89. 866 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 2007); see also Weiss, supra note 17, at 5 (discuss-
ing Rosenberg’s significance).
90. See Rosenberg, 866 N.E.2d at 443–44 (comparing Form U-5 reporting to
other quasi-judicial proceedings).  The court analogized Form U-5 reporting to
absolutely privileged complaints made to a New York bar association’s grievance
committee. See id. (noting complaints to bar association were absolutely privi-
leged). But see id. at 446 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s position that
Form U-5 reporting is quasi-judicial).  The dissent stated that the Form U-5 system
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding because “statements made on a Form U–5 are
not intended to be part of any court proceeding nor are they presented to a com-
mittee having attributes similar to a court.” Id. at 445 (Pigott, J., dissenting).  The
dissent also distinguished employers’ statements in Form U-5s from complaints
made to the bar association’s grievance committee by noting that the complaints
15
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mental agency because it has been delegated authority to enforce federal
laws and is the “primary regulator of the broker-dealer industry.”91  Fur-
thermore, the court explained that the NASD performs quasi-judicial
functions by investigating complaints from member firms and administer-
ing disciplinary proceedings.92
The court also emphasized that Form U-5s promote a significant pub-
lic interest by protecting investors and other employers from unethical
brokers.93  Assuming that absolute privilege would be more likely to pro-
mote accurate disclosures, the court explained that the NASD could more
efficiently investigate brokers.94  Additionally, the availability of Form U-5s
to prospective employers aids them in researching the background of po-
tential employees and ultimately helps the industry maintain high
standards.95
Outside of New York, only a few cases have held that employers are
subject to absolute privilege.96  Nonetheless, Rosenberg has a substantial im-
pact on the industry as a significant number of these disputes arise in New
York.97  The decision is also likely to serve as persuasive authority in states
that have yet to determine whether Form U-5s are absolutely privileged.98
to the bar association were made confidentially and were not disseminated across
the legal industry. See id.  (distinguishing Form U-5 statements from complaints to
bar association).
91. Id. at 443.  The court explained that the compulsory nature of Form U-5s
in the self-regulating system could be viewed as the first step of a quasi-judicial
process. See id. at 444 (discussing quasi-judicial qualities of Form U-5 reporting
system).
92. See id. (describing quasi-judicial functions performed by NASD).
93. See id. (noting significant public interest of investor protection). But see
Liddle & Brecher, supra note 8, at 688 (“While investor protection is a worthy
public policy, the Court’s conclusion in Rosenberg is based on the faulty premise
that brokerage firms always act in the public’s interest and will be even more likely
to do so with an absolute privilege.”).
94. See Rosenberg, 866 N.E.2d at 444 (implying that absolute privilege is more
likely to promote accurate disclosures to regulators).
95. See id. (noting accurate Form U-5 disclosures assist other employers in
researching employee backgrounds).
96. See Fontani v. Wells Fargo Invs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 842 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (applying California law to hold statements made in Form U-5s are abso-
lutely privileged); Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl.
LEXIS 85, at *19 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (holding that disclosures in Form U-5s
are subject to absolute privilege).
97. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1028 (describing impact of New York law on
securities industry).  The article explained that:
New York City accounts for 90% of all securities jobs in the state and
more than 22% of securities jobs in the nation.  In fact, the New York
metropolitan area provided 230,000 jobs in the securities industry in
2006, far more than any other city.  Wall Street alone accounted for 41%
of the jobs gained in New York City between 2003 and 2006.
Id. (footnote omitted).
98. For a discussion of the significance of Rosenberg, see infra note 174 and
accompanying text.
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C. Today’s History Lesson: Absolute Privilege in Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, absolute privilege provides immunity from civil liabil-
ity regardless of “occasion or motive.”99  Such privilege has primarily been
reserved for statements made during the course of judicial or quasi-judi-
cial proceedings as well as statements made by high public officials acting
in their official capacity.100  In these settings absolute privilege is necessary
to promote candid discourses in areas of public interest.101
In the employment context, Pennsylvania courts have held that abso-
lute privilege can extend to statements made by employers regarding a
former employee’s history at the firm.102  However, this extension of abso-
lute privilege narrowly applies to an individual who consented to publish
and receive potentially defamatory statements.103  In addition, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court in Baker v. Lafayette College104 held that “an em-
99. Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(citing Sciandra v. Lynett, 187 A.2d 586 (1963)).  The Agriss court went on to refuse
to extend absolute privilege to the employer for statements made in a disciplinary
warning letter, holding that the employer “exceed[ed] the scope of his privilege by
publishing the defamation to unauthorized parties.” Id.
100. See Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986) (“[T]he protected
realm has traditionally been regarded as composed only of those communications
which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and
material to the redress or relief sought.”); cf. Barto v. Felix, 378 A.2d 927, 929 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1977) (holding that public officials enjoy absolute immunity when mak-
ing statements pursuant to their official duties); see also Milliner v. Enck, 709 A.2d
417, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (explaining statements made during quasi-judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged); Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 956
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (recounting Pennsylvania’s traditional application of abso-
lute privilege to statements made in judicial proceedings).  The court in Barto ex-
plained that public officials need the protection of absolute privilege to act freely
in areas of public interest. See Barto, 378 A.2d at 929 (“The threat of a potential
civil suit for damages would unquestionably dampen a public official’s enthusiasm
to act in certain situations . . . .”).
101. See Binder v. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971) (discuss-
ing reasons for absolute privilege).  The court proclaimed, “[a] judge must be free
to administer the law without fear of consequences.” Id.; see also Doe v. Wyo. Valley
Health Care Sys., Inc., 987 A.2d 758, 766 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (reasoning absolute
privilege exists to promote frank disclosures).
102. See Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 504 A.2d 247, 249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(holding that written evaluations by employer are absolutely privileged if employee
consents); cf. Sobel v. Wingard, 531 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (implying
that evaluations sent to limited supervisory parties including human resources can
be absolutely privileged); DeLuca v. Reader, 323 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1974) (finding remarks between employers, employees, and unions to be abso-
lutely privileged).
103. See Frymire v. Painewebber, Inc. (In re Frymire), 87 B.R. 856, 859 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988) (reviewing Pennsylvania case law concerning absolute privilege in
employment contexts).  The court explained, “if no consent of the employee to
the publication of his evaluation by his employer has been established, by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement or otherwise, no absolute privilege should attach.” Id.
104. 504 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
17
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ployer should not be subject to a defamation suit by an employee based on
statements the employer is contractually compelled to make . . . .”105
In Baker, the plaintiff-professor claimed that a co-worker and his supe-
rior defamed him by exchanging letters that were critical of his job per-
formance.106  The plaintiff alleged that the letters were biased, false, and
ultimately led to his termination.107  Despite the plaintiff’s claims, the
court held that the superior’s letters were subject to absolute privilege be-
cause the plaintiff consented to such written evaluations in the employee
handbook.108
Relying on section 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Baker
court stated that if consent is given to an employer to publish potentially
defamatory matters, then the employer enjoys absolute privilege.109  How-
ever, the plaintiff’s co-worker was not entitled to absolute privilege be-
cause the handbook only stated that department heads would make
written evaluations.110  Although the court recognized the possibility that
an evaluation could be recklessly or maliciously drafted, it stated that as
long as employees consented to having written evaluations published, they
must have assumed the risk that the evaluations might be unfavorable.111
On the other hand, the dissent emphasized that the plaintiff only con-
sented to honest evaluations, and there was substantial evidence showing
105. Id. at 249.
106. See id. at 248 (describing allegedly defamatory letters).  The letters fo-
cused on the plaintiff’s teaching ability, relationship with co-workers, and the pres-
ence of his wife in his classes. See id. at 260 (“Professor Gluhman wrote a letter to
Provost Sause complaining of the ‘extraordinary, peculiar, and academically
deplorable arrangement’ of [plaintiff’s] wife’s ‘habitual’ presence in [plaintiff’s]
classes.”).
107. See id. at 249 (discussing plaintiff’s claim).
108. See id. (describing manner in which plaintiff consented).  The court
looked at the plaintiff’s employment contract and the university’s handbook to
determine if plaintiff gave consent. See id. (discussing contents of handbook).  The
employee handbook provided for “annual written evaluations by the department
head.” Id.
109. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583).  The court
quoted comment (f) that states:
The privilege conferred by the consent of the person about whom the
defamatory matter is published is absolute.  The protection given by it is
complete, and it is not affected by the ill will or personal hostility of the
publisher or by any improper purpose for which he may make the
publication.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. f (1977).
110. See Baker, 504 A.2d at 250 (finding co-worker’s letter not subject to abso-
lute privilege on consent grounds).  The employee handbook only provided for
formal evaluations by department heads. See id. at 249 (discussing conditions in
handbook).
111. See id. at 250 (reasoning that when employees agree to be evaluated they
risk criticism might be unfavorable or negative).  The court stated, “[t]he person
who agrees to submit his work to criticism or evaluation assumes the risk that the
criticism may be unfavorable.” Id.
18
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that his superior’s evaluations were dishonest.112  The dissent also added
that “where one does not know that a statement exists but does know that in
the course of an investigation of one’s conduct it may be made and pub-
lished . . . one’s consent to publication is consent only to publication of
honest findings.”113  Applying this reasoning to Form U-5 defamation dis-
putes, it would be inequitable to allow employers to avoid civil liability
when they use Form U-5s to retaliate or intentionally injure an ex-em-
ployee’s career.114
III. SCHOOL IS IN SESSION: MERKAM V. WACHOVIA
Gal Merkam, a former financial specialist at Wachovia, was fired for
violating the company’s code of conduct by accepting loans from a third
party and entering them into Wachovia’s computer system without first
notifying the customer.115  Merkam appealed his dismissal by filing a ter-
mination appeal request.116  In the appeal letter, Merkam admitted to vio-
lating Wachovia’s code of conduct on at least one occasion.117 After
reviewing the appeal, Wachovia upheld its decision to terminate
Merkam.118
Following his departure, Dawn Lang, Merkam’s former supervisor,
prepared a report for an unemployment compensation hearing to deter-
mine Merkam’s eligibility for benefits.119  At this hearing, Lang recited the
specific code of conduct violation that led to Merkam’s termination.120  A
112. See id. at 268 (Spaeth, J., dissenting) (asserting consent only provides
absolute privilege for honest statements).  Baker relied on comment d in Section
583 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which states, “one who agrees to submit
his conduct to investigation knowing that its results will be published, consents to
the publication of the honest findings of the investigators.” Id. at 250 (majority opin-
ion); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (1977).
113. See Baker, 504 A.2d at 269 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
114. See Matthew W. Finkin & Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Solving the Employee
Reference Problem: Lessons from the German Experience, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 387, 399
(2009) (“It is doubtful that we should be prepared to allow an employer to escape
legal scrutiny altogether when . . . it knowingly asserts a completely baseless accusa-
tion of malfeasance as the ground of discharge, uses the reference as a retaliatory
device, or uses the threat of a malicious reference . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
115. See Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
85, at *1 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (noting Merkam’s role as financial specialist in
Wachovia’s Code).  Merkam violated Wachovia’s Code of Conduct by entering an
application for a loan into Wachovia’s computer system without first speaking to
the car-dealership. See id. (describing Merkam’s violation).
116. See id. at *2 (noting Merkam’s appeal).
117. See id. (describing Merkam’s appeal letter).  The court stated, “[i]n his
letter, [Merkam] expressly conceded that, on one occasion, he had received a
faxed application for an auto loan from Tri State Auto and entered the application
into Wachovia’s computer system without first speaking to the customer.” Id.
118. See id. at *3 (noting Wachovia upheld its decision to terminate Merkam).
119. See id. (describing Dawn Lang’s involvement with Merkam’s unemploy-
ment compensation hearing).
120. See id. (“At the hearing, Ms. Lang testified and corroborated the facts as
set forth in her [r]eport.”).  In her report, Lang identified the exact company
19
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few days after the hearing, Wachovia filed Merkam’s Form U-5 with the
NASD.121
In the Form U-5, Wachovia stated that Merkam was “[t]erminated by
Wachovia Bank, for violation of Wachovia Bank’s code of conduct.”122
Wachovia went on to explain that, “[n]o Wachovia Bank or Wachovia Se-
curities Clients were affected by the code of conduct violation.”123  After
reviewing Wachovia’s statements in Merkam’s Form U-5, the NASD de-
cided to investigate Merkam.124  However, the NASD quickly ended its in-
vestigation after Wachovia identified all of the relevant facts to support its
opinion that Merkam violated its code of conduct.125
Merkam proceeded to sue Wachovia and Lang, claiming that he was
defamed by the statements made by Lang in the unemployment compen-
sation hearing and by Wachovia in his Form U-5.126  Among other things,
Merkam alleged that the negative statements in his Form U-5 tarnished his
business reputation.127  In response, Wachovia filed preliminary objec-
tions and the court dismissed the claim for legal insufficiency.128
On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed that Merkam failed
to show that Wachovia’s statements at the unemployment compensation
hearing and in the Form U-5 were defamatory.129  The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court’s ruling in an unreported memo-
randa opinion.130  In its opinion, the Superior Court refrained from dis-
policy Merkam violated and provided specific facts to show how Merkam violated
it. See id. at *15 (discussing Lang’s report).
121. See id. at *3 (noting Wachovia’s submission of Merkam’s Form U-5).
122. Id.
123. Id.  In sections 7B and 7F2 of the Form U-5, Wachovia specifically identi-
fied that Merkam was not under any internal review and was not accused of fraud.
See id. (discussing Merkam’s Form U-5).
124. See Brief for Appellant at 12, Merkam v. Wachovia, Corp., 947 A.2d 839
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (No. 230 EDA 2007), 2007 WL 2858007 (stating that Wacho-
via’s statements in Merkam’s Form U-5 prompted NASD investigation).
125. See Merkam, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 85, at *4 (explaining that
Merkam’s Form U-5 and Wachovia’s correspondence with NASD identified
enough supporting facts).
126. See id. (describing Merkam’s defamation claims).
127. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 124, at 12 (asserting damage to
reputation).
128. See Merkam, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 85, at *4–5 (discussing
court’s dismissal of Merkam’s claims).
129. See id. at *6–7 (concluding Wachovia’s statements were not defamatory).
130. See Merkam v. Wachovia, No. 230 EDA 2007, 1, 4 (Mem. Op.) (Pa. Super.
Ct. May 23, 2008) (“After reviewing the record and pertinent case law, we agree
with the trial court that all of these communications were privileged in nature, and
therefore could not expose Wachovia or Lang to liability.”).  The Superior Court
clarified whether absolute or qualified privilege applied to Wachovia’s statements
on the Form U-5. See id. at 5. (finding Wachovia’s statements to unemployment
compensation absolutely privileged).
20
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cussing whether Wachovia’s statements in the Form U-5 were subject to
absolute or a qualified privilege.131
The Court of Common Pleas began its discussion by identifying the
burdens of proof for defamation in Pennsylvania.132  First, the court ana-
lyzed whether Lang or Wachovia’s statements could be capable of a defam-
atory meaning.133  Focusing on the amount of supporting facts provided
by Lang and Wachovia in their statements, the court concluded that none
of the statements were capable of a defamatory meaning.134  The court
recognized that Lang’s statements clearly laid out all of the relevant facts
to support her opinion that Merkam violated Wachovia’s Code of Con-
duct.135  Similarly, the court explained that Wachovia provided all of the
supporting facts through its disclosures in the Form U-5 and its statements
to the NASD during the investigation.136
The second half of the court’s analysis focused on whether Wachovia
and Lang’s statements were protected by the truth and if they were abso-
lutely privileged.137  First, the court determined that Wachovia’s state-
ments were true because Merkam admitted to violating the company’s
code of conduct in his letter to appeal termination.138  Although not nec-
essary, the court proceeded to discuss whether absolute privilege applied
to Wachovia’s communications in the unemployment compensation hear-
ing and statements on the Form U-5.139
After reviewing Pennsylvania case law regarding the purpose of abso-
lute privilege, the court concluded that Wachovia’s communications to
131. See id. at 4–5 (discussing Form U-5 privilege).  The superior court did
not classify the degree of privilege provided to Form U-5s as absolute or qualified.
See id. at 5 (“[W]e conclude the trial court did not err in finding this communica-
tion was privileged.” (emphasis added)).
132. See Merkam, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 85, at *6 (listing burdens of
proof); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343 (West 1978) (providing burdens of
proof for defamation in Pennsylvania).
133. See Merkam, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 85, at *6–15 (analyzing de-
famatory nature of Lang and Wachovia’s statements).
134. See id. at *6–7 (concluding Lang and Wachovia’s statements were incapa-
ble of defamatory meaning).
135. See id. at *15 (explaining that Lang clearly laid out relevant facts to sup-
port her opinion).
136. See id. at *12 (“The Form U-5 submitted to NASD and the NASD corre-
spondence . . . conclusively establish that Wachovia informed the NASD of its opin-
ion that Plaintiff had violated Wachovia’s Code of Conduct and specifically
identified all of the facts supporting its opinion.”).
137. See id. (analyzing Lang and Wachovia’s burden of proof).
138. See id. at *13 (“Plaintiff admitted in his appeal letter that he did, on at
least one occasion, receive a faxed loan application from Tri State Auto and en-
tered the application into Wachovia’s computer system without first speaking with
the customer.”).
139. See id. (discussing applicability of absolute privilege).  At this point, the
court already determined that Lang and Wachovia’s statements were not capable
of a defamatory meaning and were protected under the absolute defense of the
truth. See id.
21
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the unemployment compensation referee were absolutely privileged.140
The court explained that absolute privilege applied because unemploy-
ment compensation hearings are “judicial” and Lang’s statements were
relevant and material to the proceedings.141
Relying on New York case law, the court explained that Wachovia’s
statements in Merkam’s Form U-5 were subject to absolute privilege.142  In
reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that without the threat of
civil liability, employers would be more likely to provide more accurate
information on Form U-5s.143  However, the court did not acknowledge
that the majority rule outside of Pennsylvania is qualified privilege.144
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Court of Common Pleas correctly held that Wachovia and Lang
were not liable for defamation because the statements were true but
should not have extended absolute privilege to Merkam’s Form U-5.145
First, making Form U-5s immune from all liability under any circumstance
is inconsistent with the purpose of absolute privilege.146  Second, the
court did not definitively show that the public interest is actually protected
by providing absolute privilege.147  Finally, if absolute privilege becomes
the law in Pennsylvania, employees’ reputations will be left at the mercy of
their employer.148
140. See id. at *17 (“Since Ms. Lang’s alleged statements were relevant and
material to the judicial proceedings before the Unemployment Compensation Ref-
eree, they are protected by an absolute privilege.”).  In its review of the original
purpose of absolute privilege, the court cited the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Binder to show that absolute privilege was initially deployed to promote the free
administration of justice in judicial proceedings. See id. at *16.
141. See id. at *17 (citing Milliner v. Enck, 709 A.2d 417, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998)) (implying unemployment compensation hearings are judicial proceedings
protected by absolute privilege).
142. See id. at *18 (relying on New York case law applying absolute privilege to
statements made on Form U-5s).  The court was persuaded by the reasoning of the
New York Court of Appeals in Rosenberg. See id.
143. See id. (citing Cicconi v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 808 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607–08
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005)) (noting that Form U-5s protect investors “by assuring bro-
kerage firms that they will not be liable in tort for statements in their mandatory U-
5 filings, [thus] avoid[ing] the possibility that they will hesitate to clearly state the
exact grounds for an employee’s termination”).
144. See generally id. (avoiding discussion of majority view of courts that state-
ments made in Form U-5s are subject to qualified privilege).
145. For a discussion of why the court should not have extended absolute
privilege, see infra notes 149–90 and accompanying text.
146. For a further discussion of how the Form U-5 is not part of a quasi-judi-
cial proceeding, see infra notes 149–63 and accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion of how absolute privilege for Form U-5s does not
necessarily benefit the investing public, see infra notes 164–73 and accompanying
text.
148. For a further discussion of the potential impact of Merkam’s holding, see
infra notes 174–90 and accompanying text.
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A. The Form U-5 Reporting System Lacks the “Judicial” Part of a Quasi-
Judicial Proceeding
When employers file Form U-5s, they are not participating in a typical
quasi-judicial process worthy of absolute privilege.149  In some respects,
the Form U-5 reporting system administers quasi-judicial functions be-
cause it enables regulators to investigate brokers and allows FINRA to en-
force federal securities laws.150  On the other hand, the reporting system
reaches outside the scope of the quasi-judicial process by creating a mas-
sive database of “employee references” for its member firms.151  To ad-
dress this conundrum, it is important to review the purpose of absolute
privilege.152
The Court of Common Pleas correctly identified that the original pur-
pose of absolute privilege was to promote the free administration of justice
by judges and to promote the participation of litigants and witnesses in
trials.153  While Pennsylvania has extended absolute privilege to quasi-judi-
cial proceedings like unemployment compensation hearings, those pro-
ceedings retain essential elements of a traditional judicial process.154
Unlike an unemployment compensation hearing, the Form U-5 reporting
system lacks fundamental “judicial” characteristics.155  For example, em-
149. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (“[T]he submission of a U-5 form and its transmission (upon request) to
members of the NASD are not stages in the association’s quasi-judicial regulatory
process.”); cf. Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439, 446 (N.Y. 2007) (Pigott,
J., dissenting) (asserting Form U-5s do not represent preliminary phase of quasi-
judicial proceeding). But see Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that Form U-5s are prepared in connection with
quasi-judicial administrative proceeding).
150. See Baravati, 28 F.3d at 708 (explaining NASD performs quasi-judicial
functions).  The court explained that the NASD performs quasi-judicial functions
by requiring member firms to self-report violations, conducting investigations, and
imposing sanctions. See id.
151. See id. (stating that disseminating Form U-5s across securities industry is
not quasi-judicial).
152. For a discussion of the purpose of absolute privilege, see infra notes
153–63 and accompanying text.
153. See Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
85, at *16 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (citing Binder v. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 275
A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971)) (explaining original rationale for absolute privilege was to
allow judges to freely administer law and encourage witnesses and parties to par-
ticipate candidly in proceedings).
154. See Shortz v. Farrell, 193 A. 20, 22 (Pa. 1937) (holding proceedings
before unemployment compensation hearing board are quasi-judicial).  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court explained that the proceeding was of a judicial character
because the unemployment compensation board had the power to issue subpoe-
nas, apply legal rules, administer oaths, require attendance of witnesses, and adju-
dicate disputes. See id. (explaining that proceeding possessed fundamental
characteristics of typical courtrooms); see also Milliner v. Enck, 709 A.2d 417, 421
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting other instances where absolute privilege was ex-
tended to quasi-judicial proceedings).
155. See Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 137 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding submission of Form U-5s to be formality that is not part of NASD’s
23
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ployees lack a meaningful opportunity to dispute potentially defamatory
or false statements, FINRA regulators are not necessarily weighing evi-
dence and resolving disputes, and investigations do not accompany all
Form U-5 filings.156
The Merkam court also emphasized that absolute privilege applies to
all pleadings pertinent to a judicial proceeding.157  However, unlike tradi-
tional pleadings in which both parties submit statements to be evaluated
by a judge, employers truly dominate the Form U-5 reporting system.158
Moreover, under an absolute privilege standard, employees can only chal-
lenge an employer’s statements through an expensive expungement pro-
cess.159  Recognizing this issue, the dissent in Rosenberg stated that “[i]f the
Form U–5 were part of a quasi-judicial process, then an expungement ac-
tion would be entirely unnecessary.”160
Finally, the Merkam court did not explain how Form U-5’s role of pro-
viding “employee references” falls within the gambit of a “quasi-judicial”
process that deserves absolute privilege.161  On the contrary, the Penn-
sylvania legislature has stated in Section 8340.1 of the Pennsylvania Code
that when employers provide employee references they are presumed to
be acting in good faith unless it can be shown that the employer knew its
statements were false, materially misleading, or made with reckless disre-
gard for the truth.162  Given the serious impact Form U-5s can have on a
quasi-judicial regulatory process); cf. Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439,
445 (N.Y. 2007) (Pigott, J., dissenting) (“[S]tatements made on a Form U–5 are
not intended to be part of any court proceeding nor are they presented to a com-
mittee having attributes similar to a court.”); see also Tann, supra note 6, at 1036
(comparing formality of filing Form U-5s to filing police reports).  The court
noted that a majority of states only provide police reports with a qualified privilege
to protect the reputation interest of individuals. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1036
(“Although there is a vital public interest in ensuring that individuals report crimes
to the police, there must also be sufficient protection of the accused’s reputational
interest.”).
156. See Rosenberg, 866 N.E.2d at 445 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (explaining why
Form U-5s are not quasi-judicial).  The dissent emphasized that the employee did
not have an opportunity to challenge the statements made on his Form U-5. See id.
at 446.
157. See Binder, 275 A.2d at 56 (“[S]tatements by a party, a witness, counsel, or
a judge cannot be the basis of a defamation action whether they occur in the
pleadings or in open court.”).
158. See Rosenberg, 866 N.E.2d at 446 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (implying employ-
ers have too much control over Form U-5 reporting system).
159. See id. at 446 n.3 (“Indeed, a costly expungement action is often the only
means by which an employee may challenge defamatory statements made on a
Form U-5.”); see also Tann, supra note 6, at 1042–43 (arguing that expungement
proceedings do not provide adequate protection to employees).
160. Rosenberg, 866 N.E.2d at 446 n.3 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl.
LEXIS 85, at *18 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (discussing benefits of absolute privi-
lege but avoiding arguments for potentially negative consequences).
162. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.1 (West 2005) (describing rebuttable
good faith presumption for employers when making employee references).
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professional’s reputation, the court in Merkam did not adequately explain
how the widespread dissemination of Form U-5s across the securities in-
dustry is sufficiently judicial in character.163
B. Absolute Privilege for Form U-5 Reporting Is not “Absolutely Necessary” to
Protect the Public
Merkam serves as evidence that the regulatory objectives of the Form
U-5 can be satisfied without absolute privilege.164  According to the court’s
reasoning, Merkam’s defamation claims would have failed under a quali-
fied privilege standard because Wachovia was acting in good faith and tell-
ing the truth.165  In effect, regulators and other employers would have
received the same information about Merkam’s employment history.166
At the time Wachovia completed Merkam’s Form U-5, the company
did not believe that its statements were absolutely privileged.167  Despite
believing that it could be held liable for defamation, Wachovia was honest
and gave Merkam a “negative reference.”168  Accordingly, Wachovia’s con-
duct demonstrates that the “chilling effect” of defamation might not be as
strong as proponents of absolute privilege suggest.169
Further, it is not entirely clear how disseminating the reasons for
Merkam’s termination to prospective employers would better protect in-
vestors.170  Merkam’s violation had no negative effect on Wachovia’s cli-
ents.171  The behavior was not illegal, and regulators did not believe it was
163. For a discussion of Merkam’s explanation, see supra notes 132–44 and
accompanying text.
164. See Tann, supra note 6, at 1040–41 (“[Q]ualified privilege benefits the
securities industry by encouraging employers to give complete and accurate refer-
ences.”).  To deter the submission of “clean” Form U-5s, states that have enacted
qualified privilege statutes protect employers unless actual malice can be proven.
See id. at 1041.
165. See Brief of Appellees at 21–22 n.2, Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., 947 A.2d
839 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 23, 2008) (No. 230 EDA 2007), 2007 WL 2858008 (“[E]ven
if this Court were to hold that a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege attaches
to Wachovia’s statements to the NASD, the Complaint and attached exhibits, taken
together, fall [sic] to establish Wachovia’s abuse of a qualified privilege . . . .”).
166. For a description of the negative content of Merkam’s Form U-5, see supra
notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
167. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 165, at 21–22 (citing majority of case
law supporting qualified privilege and explaining absolute privilege does not apply
outside of New York).
168. See Merkam v. Wachovia Corp., No. 2397, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
85, at *3 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 8, 2008) (describing content of Merkam’s Form U-5).
169. See Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging firms are under pressure to provide clean Form U-5s but holding
firms can still satisfy regulatory reporting under qualified privilege).
170. See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 8, at 691 (arguing that public interest is
not advanced by making statements in Form U-5s absolutely privileged).
171. See Merkam, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 85, at *3 (noting Merkam’s
conduct did not affect Wachovia’s clients).
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even worthy of sanctions.172  In the words of the Seventh Circuit, applying
absolute privilege to situations like Merkam’s is “strong medicine.”173
C. Absolute Privilege Could Become a Reality in Pennsylvania
The Merkam court’s adoption of Rosenberg illustrates how states with-
out a mandatory qualified privilege standard are likely to react to new ar-
guments for absolute privilege.174  Although not binding in Pennsylvania,
Merkam laid a foundation for future arguments supporting absolute
privilege.175
One avenue by which this might occur is an employer arguing that its
statements are absolutely privileged because the employee at issue con-
sented to the employer publishing the reasons for the employee’s termina-
tion.176  According to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Baker, absolute
privilege can be conferred by consent.177  Further, the court in Baker ex-
plained that employers should not be liable for defamation when they are
contractually compelled to make certain statements.178  Applying Baker to
Form U-5s, employers could argue that employees confer consent by sign-
ing their Form U-4, which expressly provides consent for employers to
make the Form U-5 disclosures.179  Employers may also argue that they
deserve protection because they are obligated by FINRA to submit Form
U-5s after firing an employee.180
Conversely, securities professionals can argue that application of Baker
should be limited to internal evaluations.181  Recognizing the serious risks
to an individual’s reputation, the dissent in Baker reasoned that individuals
only consent to the publication of honest statements.182  Applying this rea-
172. See id. at *4 (stating that NASD chose to take no action against Merkam).
173. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994).
174. See Weiss, supra note 17, at 5 (predicting that Rosenberg’s holding will in-
fluence jurisdictions outside of New York).
175. See generally Merkam v. Wachovia, No. 230 EDA 2007, 1, 4 (Mem. Op.)
(Pa. Super. Ct. May 23, 2008).  The fact that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
avoided discussing whether absolute privilege applies to Form U-5s might suggest
that the court was not ready to address the issue. See id.
176. For a further discussion of this potential reality, see infra notes 177–80
and accompanying text.
177. See Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 504 A.2d 247, 249–50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(stating that consent can confer absolute privilege).
178. See id. (stating employers should not be liable for defamation based on
statements they are contractually compelled to make).
179. For a discussion of Form U-4’s consent aspect, see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
180. For an explanation of how employers are obligated by FINRA to submit
Form U-5s after firing employees, see supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
181. See Baker, 504 A.2d at 253 (noting significance that evaluation was limited
to internal members of college).
182. See id. at 268–69 (asserting that consent only applies to publication of
honest remarks).
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soning to Form U-5 disclosures, employers would only be protected if their
statements were honest.183
As former SEC Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt, Jr. argued, if absolute
privilege becomes the law in Pennsylvania and other states, the SEC
should enact a regulation mandating a qualified privilege.184  Such action
would be necessary to protect employees who would be left at the mercy of
their employers.185  Moreover, the need for a qualified privilege rule be-
comes especially apparent in certain egregious circumstances where em-
ployers use Form U-5s to retaliate against employees.186
One alternative to providing employers with absolute privilege, which
Mr. Hunt and others have floated, could be to give employees an opportu-
nity to challenge the content of their Form U-5 in front of a FINRA arbi-
tration panel before the Form U-5s are published.187  This option allows
employees to dispute the language they claim is defamatory and holds em-
ployers accountable for the statements they make.188  Having a FINRA ar-
bitration panel determine whether a statement is defamatory before it is
published may also provide employers with some assurance that they will
not be held liable for defamation down the road.189  Ultimately, this type
of proposal provides benefits to both employees and employers, shifts re-
sponsibility to FINRA regulators to determine the defamatory nature and
truthfulness of statements, and makes the reporting system more judicial
in character.190
183. See id. (explaining only honest evaluations are privileged).
184. See Hunt, supra note 9, at 6 (advocating SEC might need to act if absolute
privilege becomes law).  The former commissioner of the SEC believed that a qual-
ified privilege rule might be necessary if the New York Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of absolute privilege. See Jacob H. Zamansky, Form U-5: Unequal Justice in State,
U.S. Courts, INVESTMENTNEWS (May 30, 2006), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20060530/SUB/605300701 (stating SEC should enact qualified immunity
rule to protect reputations of honest brokers).
185. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994) (describing vulnerability of employees).
186. For examples of employees maliciously defamed by employers, see supra
notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
187. See Hunt, supra note 9, at 7 (presenting qualified privilege rules that can
be considered by SEC).  The commissioner detailed a proposal from the Vice
Chairman of Merrill Lynch that calls for arbitration to settle disputes before Form
U-5s are submitted to the CRD. See id. (“The arbitrator could affirm or modify the
U-5 language, and the decision would preclude seeking other redress based upon
the original or modified language.”).
188. See id. (explaining potential benefits for employees).  Employees could
have the language in their Form U-5 modified if they believe it is defamatory or
untrue. See id. (describing employees’ ability to challenge language in Form U-5 in
front of FINRA arbitrators).
189. See id. (describing potential benefits for employers).
190. See id. (discussing advantages and drawbacks of proposal).
27
Catuzzi: Please Be Delicate With My Permanent Record: The Pendulum Inches
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 28  3-APR-13 10:58
238 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 211
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Merkam decision lies in its
potential to demonstrate how Rosenberg’s reasoning can spread to states
with unsettled law.191  The decision also comes at a time when arguments
for absolute privilege are likely to increase as FINRA demands more infor-
mation from employers.192  Therefore, if absolute privilege eventually be-
comes the law in Pennsylvania or other states, the SEC should take action
to protect employees’ reputations.193
191. See Anne Marie Estevez, Absolute Privilege Protects Employers’ Statements,
LAW360 2–3 (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Estevez_Employ-
Law360.pdf (“The Rosenberg decision is likely to be used as support for extending
the absolute privilege not only to Form U-5 reporting in other states but also to
other similar forms of mandatory regulatory reporting designed to protect the
public.”); see also Weiss, supra note 17, at 5 (discussing influence of Rosenberg
decision).
192. See REGULATORY NOTICE 10–39, supra note 45, at 3 (“[A] firm may be
required to provide an affirmative answer to a question even if the matter is not
securities-related.”); see also Chris Kentouris, Finra Wants More Details When Someone
Gets Canned, ONWALLSTREET (Oct. 1, 2010), (“[T]he firm must also disclose if it
fired an employee for ‘misconduct,’ even if the firm was not making the allega-
tions, and even if the misconduct did not involve a customer of the firm.”); Edward
Beeson, FINRA Warns on U5 Shortcomings, COMPLIANCE REP. (Sept. 17, 2010), availa-
ble at 2010 WLNR 19689664 (“Industry officials cautioned that complying with
FINRA’s demands will ratchet up pressure on firms and likely spark lawsuits from
aggrieved former workers.”).
193. See Hunt, supra note 9, at 6 (“If the pendulum begins to swing in favor of
absolute immunity, the Commission may need to consider whether to act.”).
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